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BILLIONAIRE CAN’T BUY THE BEACH 
D'ereka Bolden1 
I. INTRODUCTION
The present case, Surfrider v. Martins Beach 1 LLC, et al., balances is-
sues of the public’s entitlement to the use and enjoyment of open land 
against the demands of business corporations seeking to own and develop 
coastal land. The parties here are the greatest examples of these interests. 
The appellant is a billionaire, credited with co-founding the Sun Microsys-
tems company, who purchased the beach property in question for thirty-
seven million dollars.2 The appellees are a nonprofit foundation galvanized 
towards preserving the public’s access to beaches for recreation.3 The Cali-
fornia Coastal Act that governs the interpretation of the facts in this case is 
rooted in considerations for the environment, and the inclusion of the public 
on matters pertaining to development. There are many perspectives at play 
here, but the most prominent is that of the state of California itself.  
On a larger scale, this case is but one in a long line of legislation that 
evidences the state of California’s hold on all attempts of private property 
owners to fully exercise their property rights over their own land. California 
has utilized its power to curtail the property rights of private owners across 
many cases since the passing of their California Coastal Act in 1972.4 Surf-
rider v. Martins Beach 1 LLC, et al. shows California’s agenda to promote 
environmental conservation at all costs. In this case, the court opted for a 
literal interpretation of the definitions provided in the Coastal Act to ulti-
mately decide in favor of the appellees, the Surfrider Foundation. 
1 D'ereka Bolden is a Senior Staff Editor for the University of Baltimore School of Law 
Journal of Land and Development. 
2 Bill Chappell, California Court Orders Venture Capitalist to Reopen Disputed Beach, 
National Public Radio (August 11, 2017, 1:30PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2017/08/11/542827955/california-court-orders-venture-capitalist-to-reopen-
disputed-beach. 
3 Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach 1, LLC, 14 Cal. App. 5th 238, 1 (2017).   
4 The California Coastal Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 30000-0900 (Deering 1982). 
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II. BACKGROUND / HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Procedural History of Surfrider Foundation v. Martins Beach
LLC et al.
Prior to the appellant’s purchase of Martins Beach, the public was 
permitted to access the beach by entrance from Martins Beach Road using 
an adjoining parking lot.5 Officials from the governing county of San Mateo 
also informed appellant that there was existing public access to the beach 
that was “required to be preserved by the Local Coastal Program.”6 In Sep-
tember 2009, appellants prevented the public from accessing the beach by 
closing the gate at the entrance, posting a sign that read “no access,” and 
painting over a billboard that advertised admission to the beach and the 
public parking lot.7 Appellees also stated that security guards were em-
ployed to prevent the public from entering.8 These actions prompted the San 
Mateo County Planning and Building Department to send an “Informal 
Warning Letter” to appellants stating that they may be found to be in viola-
tion of the Coastal Act because they were changing the, “intensity of use of 
water or access thereto,” by limiting the public’s use of the beach.9 Seeing 
no change in the appellants’ actions, the California Coastal Commission 
and the San Mateo County government sent additional notices to appellant 
stating that the closure of the beach was unlawful without a coastal devel-
opment permit, because their actions constituted “development” under the 
Coastal Act.10 Appellants responded to these notices stating that the pub-
lic’s access to the beach was conditioned on the property owner’s discre-
tion, and was exempt from government regulation because there was no 
easement granted on the property.11 
This response, and the continued dismissal of the public from Mar-
tins Beach, led the Surfrider Foundation to file suit in March of 2013, re-
questing injunctive and declaratory judgments. The trial court decided ap-
pellant had participated in “development” as defined by the Coastal Act and 
5  Surfrider Found., 14 Cal. App. 5th 238 at 2. 
6 Id. at 245.  
7 Id. at 245-246. 
8 Id. at 247. 
9 Id. at  246. 
10 Id. at 246-247. 
11 Id. at 247. 
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entered judgment in favor of appellee in December of 2014.12 Attorney’s 
fees and other costs were also awarded to Surfrider in May of 2015.  
Appellants appealed this decision, and argued that limiting the pub-
lic’s access to the beach was not a form of development, since the court in-
correctly interpreted the meaning of development under the Coastal act. 
Appellant also argued the requirement to apply for a coastal development 
permit under this Act was a constitutional violation of the federal and state 
Takings Clauses. Next, appellants argued the lower courts injunction requir-
ing them to allow the public access to Martins Beach was a per se physical 
taking. Lastly, appellants argued that the trial court’s injunction was a viola-
tion of their fundamental property right of exclusion.  
The holding of this case would have impacted anyone involved in 
development, including the public that are impacted by the development of 
land. The interpretation of the term development, as it was applied under 
the Coastal Act, provided the state with broad regulatory power. As noted 
in the case, the term “development” was examined with an “expansive in-
terpretation.”13 The court makes it clear that development is not confined to 
its basic meaning that would encompass actions such as, “constructing or 
demolishing a building.”14 It is the liberal interpretation of the term devel-
opment that propels this case forward, where other arguments are quickly 
shut down in this opinion. 
B. The California Coastal Act
The California Coastal Act was enacted to carry out the environ-
mental policy passed by Congress, in order to provide tools to local munici-
palities to manage the Nation’s coastlines and related natural resources.15 
12 Id. at 248. 
13 Id.  
14 Id. at 251-252. 
15 The California Coastal Act, PUB. RES. CODE § 30001.5 (Deering 1982). This section 
of the Code provides the “Basic Goals” of the Act which are to, ‘(a) protect, maintain, 
and where feasible, enhance and restore the overall quality of the coastal zone environ-
ment and its natural and artificial resources. (b) assure orderly, balanced utilization and 
conservation of coastal zone resources taking into account the social and economic 
needs of the people of the state. (c) maximize public access to and along the coast and 
maximize public recreational opportunities in the coastal zone consistent with sound 
resources conservation principles and constitutionally protected rights of private proper-
ty owners. (d) assure priority for coastal dependent and coastal-related development 
over other development on the coast. (e) encourage state and local initiatives and coop-
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Congress passed Title 16 U.S.C. 1451-1464 in 1972, which provided the 
policy guidelines for the California State Legislature to pass legislation 
provisions, like the Coastal Act, that would provide much guidance to the 
court in deciding this case.16 This Act is also a source for the court’s defini-
tion of the term “development,” which subsequently became a major dis-
pute raised by the appellant in this case. Section 30106 of the Act, which 
defines “development as, “on land, in or under water… change in the inten-
sity of use of water, or of access thereto…,” played a major role in the anal-
ysis of the appellant’s argument.17 
“The [California] Coastal Act of 1976 was enacted by the Legisla-
ture as a comprehensive scheme to govern land use planning for the entire 
local zone of California.”18 A stated purpose of the Act is “protection of the 
state’s natural and scenic resources….”19 Another stated purpose of this leg-
islation is to, “maximize public access to and along the coast and maximize 
public recreation opportunities in the coastal zone….”20 These purposes, in 
addition to other stated goals of the Act, are evidence that there were many 
policy rationales that could have also swayed the court’s opinion in this 
case.  
III. ANALYSIS
A. Effect of this holding on the interpretation of development
Whether the appellants violated the terms of the Coastal Act was
dependent on the court’s interpretation of the term “development.” The 
broad application of this term influenced the decision against the appellant 
and is one of the larger factors that caused the appellant to lose the case. It 
is admitted, in this opinion, that the definitions given to the term, “devel-
opment,” are not those of conventional wisdom; instead section 30106 of 
the Coastal Act explains what is within the realm of development.21 This 
eration in preparing procedures to implement coordinated planning and development for 
mutually beneficial uses, including educational uses, in the coastal zone.’” 
16 Id.  
17 Surfrider Found.,14 Cal. App. 5th at 246-48.  
18 Id. at 249.  
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 250. 
21 This section of the Coastal Act includes the following in its definition of develop-
ment, “change in the intensity of use of water, or of access thereto; construction, recon-
struction, demolition, or alteration of the size of any structure, including any facility of 
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section states that the activities encompassed in the term “development” are 
categorized as such because they, “significantly change the nature of the 
land or a structure built on the land in question.”22 This quote gives some 
explanation as to why the term must be interpreted so broadly that it affects 
a range of environmental activity. As previously stated, the Act was created 
with the intention to conserve environmental resources, and provide a 
means to ensure the public’s continued use of these resources. This statuto-
ry motivation further adds to the appellee’s argument to allow the continued 
access and use of the beach to the public.  
B. Effect of this holding on the constitutional interpretation of the Tak-
ings Clause
The holding pertaining to the Takings Clause23 did not greatly af-
fect the law, as the court found the appellant’s argument for a violation of 
the Takings Clause24 was not ripe to be reviewed.25 It was held that appel-
lant’s claim was not ripe for review because their claim was dependent up-
on having actually applied for a coastal development permit.26 Ultimately, 
the court found that there was no taking of appellant’s land because their 
actions required that they follow the appropriate administrative process to 
apply for a development permit.27 The court’s explanation was as follows, 
“a requirement that a person obtain a permit before engaging in a certain 
use of his or her property does not itself ‘take’ the property in any sense, af-
ter all, the very existence of a permit system implies that permission may be 
granted.”28 Therefore, this premise of the appellant’s argument was not ripe 
for consideration until they had exhausted the administrative process avail-
able to them. The court found it could not evaluate the appellant’s argument 
any private, public, or municipal utility; and the removal or harvesting of major vegeta-
tion other than for agricultural purposes…..”  Id. at 250. 
22 Id. at 251.  
23 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
24 Id. 
25 Surfrider Found., 14 Cal. App. 5th 238, at 259.. The Takings Clause of the United 
States Constitution guarantees that no person’s property will be taken by the govern-
ment, without being compensated fairly for its value. The fifth amendment of the con-
stitution guarantees this. “nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation” U.S. Const. amend. V. 
26 Id. at 258.  
27 Id. at 257. 
28 Id. 
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on this issue, but then proceeded to evaluate the argument anyway to show 
how it was unsuccessful. By notifying appellant that there were still admin-
istrative options to be pursued, prior to bringing suit, there was too much 
legislative deference to those enforcing the provisions of the Coastal Act, 
when the court could instead evaluate the permissibility of the terms of the 
Act itself. For example, there was no explanation to justify the administra-
tive provisions that the appellant must pursue to receive a solution for their 
problem. The court merely states the appellant needs to pursue the process 
provided by the Act, and then appeal to the court as a last resort.  
However, this was the crux of the court’s evaluation of the appel-
lant’s argument because Martins Beach 1, LLC attempted to argue that 
there were other constitutional violations of the Takings Clause, including a 
per se physical taking, 29 where the lower court’s injunction allowed the 
public to enter Martins Beach.30 Appellant’s argument was again rejected, 
but this time it was stated that their decision was based on the appellant’s 
lack of providing factors as support for their argument.31 It was then held 
that there may be support for this issue where it can be shown that regula-
tion passed by another branch of government, namely the legislative 
branch, essentially diminishes an owner’s rights to their property.32 Multi-
ple scenarios where a per se taking of property has been found were provid-
ed, including, “regulations that completely deprive an owner of all econom-
ically beneficial use of her property, as well as government action that 
requires an owner to suffer a permanent physical invasion of her proper-
ty.”33 It was also stated that aside from these instances, per se takings argu-
ments must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis because they, “turn on sit-
uation-specific factual inquiries.”34 Other factors should be provided by a 
party arguing this issue as support for their argument as stated in this opin-
ion, including “the economic impact of the regulation…. and the character 
of the government action.”35 Because the appellant failed to provide an ar-
gument that showed that they were negatively affected by some legislative 
regulation, and also failed to use any of these stated factors, there was not a 
holding in their favor on this issue. 
29  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
30 Surfrider Found, 14 Cal. App. 5th at 263 
31 Id. at 272.  
32 Id. at 258-59  
33 Id. at 264.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 265.  
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The evaluation of appellant’s per se takings claim assisted the prop-
erty owner here because the court hints at ways their argument could have 
been strengthened. It appears as though the court was trying to layout the 
applicable information for this claim that should be used by a party in order 
to present a fully supported argument. However, it now seems as though the 
private property owner has no dog in the fight against the legislator for the 
court to find they should be able to exercise their full range of rights over 
their own property, namely being able to exclude the public from using its 
property.   
Feduniak v. California is a similar case where the California 
Coastal Commission won in a battle against private landowners regarding 
the use of their property.36 In 2000, the Feduniak’s purchased a home in 
Pebble Beach California for thirteen million dollars.37 When the couple pur-
chased their property, the prior owners, the Bonanno family, already in-
stalled a three-hole golf course.38 Sometime during the 1980’s, the Bonanno 
family granted an open space easement to the Coastal Commission that lim-
ited development on their property because it was found to be in an “envi-
ronmentally sensitive habitat area”.39 Despite the fact that the Commission 
stated that their property contained endangered dune vegetation, the Bonan-
no family still installed a three-hole golf course that they knew violated 
their easement.40  
In 2002 the Coastal Commission sought to enforce an open space 
easement against the Feduniaks that would require them to remove the golf 
course and begin a plan to restore the vegetation native to the area.41 After 
the Feduniak’s refusal to comply with their easement, the Commission 
sought to enforce restoration orders that would require them to restore the 
dune vegetation native to their property.42  
The Coastal Commission won this case, and it was decided that the 
Feduniaks could not use estoppel to prevent the Commission from requiring 
them to comply with the open space easement.43 The court was not swayed 
in favor of the Feduniaks by their claims that the cost of removal was an un-
36 Feduniak v. California Coastal Commission, 148 Cal. App. 4th 1346 (2007). 
37 Feduniak, 148 Cal. App. 4th at 1354-5.  
38 Id. at 1354.  
39 Id. at 1352. 
40 Id. at 1354. 
41 Id. at 1355. 
42 Id. at 1355-6. 
43 Id. at 1378. 
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fair burden to them, and that they would lose significant enjoyment of their 
property if they had to remove the golf course.44 It was stated that, “the real 
injury is that they would no longer be able to own, see, and use a private 
golf course.”45 Despite the fact that the permit went unenforced for many 
years, the court found that the Feduniaks had no equitable argument against 
the Commission. Even testimony from multiple government officials show-
ing they ignored the issue posed by the golf course for many years went ig-
nored. One official testified that as a former member of the Commission, he 
had no knowledge of the open space easement on the Feduniak’s property, 
and that he knew the golf course existed for many years prior to the Com-
mission’s enforcement of the easement.46 Another official testified that the 
Commission was so backed-up that it could not enforce compliance with 
permits due to a lack of staff and funding stating it was, “humanly impossi-
ble to continue to visit each parcel to monitor compliance with permit con-
ditions.”47 These admissions showing the Commission’s inability to keep up 
with the work, which was meant to be achieved under the Coastal Act, did 
not result in a ruling for the Feduniaks.  
This holding begs the question of when do we hold the state gov-
ernment accountable, and allow for owners to enjoy their property in the 
way they see fit? Although this case does not involve an issue of public use 
of an individual’s property, this is another example of the California gov-
ernment intruding on the rights of the individual in order to supposedly pre-
serve the environment.  
C. Effect of this holding on the right to exclude others from your prop-
erty
In this case, it was found that there was no violation of the appellant’s 
rights as property owners even though they were not allowed to exercise 
their right to exclude the public from Martins Beach, due to the lower 
court’s injunction. The appellees argued there was an established public use 
of the property that entitled them to access the land, which the court de-
clined to accept.48 It was instead decided that despite this historical practice, 
there was no right of the public that was, “recorded or judicially deter-
44 Id. at 1379. 
45 Id. at 1380. 
46 Id. at 1356. 
47 Id.  
48 Surfrider Found., 14 Cal. App. 5th 238 at 26-7. 
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mined,” which would have created a permanency for the public to be able to 
access the land.49 There was a compromise on this issue because they found 
the injunction could only temporarily restrict appellant’s rights to exclude 
the public from their land until a further judicial determination was made. 
This determination allowed the appellant’s a small win because the court 
acknowledged that aside from the injunction, there was other evidence of 
judicial action that could show the public was entitled to long-term use of 
their land. Despite the ruling on the other issues presented in this case, 
which clearly put the rights of society above that of the individual, the court 
was reluctant to state this in their holding, and rightfully so. The court’s 
hesitation to agree with the appellees in this case, and portray a broad hold-
ing on this issue, shows some restraint in its decision that works in favor of 
the appellant, the majority of this holding. 
D. Effect of the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in this case
Perhaps viewing the direction of this holding as inspiration to carry
forward, appellant Vinod Khosla continued his legal pursuit to reaffirm the 
protection of individual property rights by petitioning the Supreme Court. 
Mr. Khosla cited his decision to continue litigation in this matter on his be-
lief that the protection of individual property rights needed to be reaf-
firmed.50 In his words “once you’re there in principal, you can’t give up 
principal.”51 Mr. Khosla’s final appeal to the Supreme Court posed a risk to 
the strength of the California Coastal Act and the miles of coastal land it 
was enacted to protect, but in his opinion, it was worth it as he stated “I 
don’t want to weaken it by winning.”52 “But property rights are even more 
important.”53 Proponents of Khosla have argued that the repercussions of a 
decision in his favor from the Supreme Court could greatly affect beach ac-
cess in locations beyond the area of their dispute.54 
49 Id. 
50 See Nellie Bowles, Every Generation Gets the Beach Villain it Deserves, NEW YORK 
TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/technology/vinod-khosla-
beach.html?module=inline, 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 See Martin Wisckol, Martins Beach Access: Supreme Court Declines to Hear Chal-
lenge of California Coastal Act, THE ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Oct. 1, 2018 at 7:45 am), 
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Ultimately, On October 1, 2018 the Supreme Court denied certiora-
ri to rule on the issues presented by this suit.55 Counsel for the Surfrider 
foundation applauded this denial, and stated its importance to “secure beach 
access for all people.”56 In no hurry to conceded to defeat, Khosla stated that 
he and his legal team would next pursue actually completing the administra-
tive process required by the Coastal Commission to request a permit in order 
to limit the access of the public to the beachfront property.57 
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the appellant did not win over the California Court of Ap-
peals with any of his arguments, it’s ruling initially showed promise for a 
new pattern to be established in some areas of the law. The interpretation of 
the term “development” by this court is notable because of how expansion-
ist it is. Although the court notes it applied a literal interpretation of the 
term according to what was provided by the Coastal Act, the expanded in-
terpretation of the term is arguably the basis to allow the act to have such a 
far regulatory reach. Despite this expansion in legal interpretation, the court 
also made it clear in its past decisions that they are unlikely to decide 
against the state government, even where they have grounds to do so. The 
court’s holding in this case and in Feduniak showed the courts deference to 
the Commission to carry out the legislative purpose of the Coastal Act. The 
court proved that they were only willing to go but so far to establish the ap-
pellees, as representatives of the general public, had grounds to argue the 
existence of an established right to access the appellant’s land.  
Despite this interpretation by the California State Court, appellant’s 
pursuit to challenge the California Coastal Act’s triumph over individual 
property rights will never be heard before the ultimate authority, the Su-
preme Court of the United States. The Court’s denial of certiorari to hear 
this argument shows the balance between coastal conservation and individ-
                                                                                                                                          
https://www.ocregister.com/2018/10/01/martins-beach-access-supreme-court-declines-
hearing-challenge-to-california-coastal-act/. 
55 Martins Beach 1, LLC v. Surfrider Foundation, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/martins-beach-1-llc-v-surfrider-
foundation/. (last visited Jan. 1, 2019). 
56 See Martin Wisckol, Martins Beach Access: Supreme Court Declines to Hear Chal-
lenge of California Coastal Act, THE ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Oct. 1, 2018 at 7:45 am), 
https://www.ocregister.com/2018/10/01/martins-beach-access-supreme-court-declines-
hearing-challenge-to-california-coastal-act/. 
57 Id. 
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ual property rights, including that of exclusion, are balanced in favor of en-
vironmental preservation. The Court is clearly not ready to limit the protec-
tions afforded to the environment or to curtail the availability of the public 
to access these spaces, even if it means infringing on the rights of an indi-
vidual to enjoy and exclude others from their property. 
